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ABSTRACT 
Contingency approaches to organizing suggest that policy objec- 
tives are more likely to be achieved if the structures employed for 
implementation mesh with the policy objectives being sought. Intero- 
rganizational arrangements are used increasingly in carrying out 
public programs, and contingency logic can be used to assess the 
degree of match between policy objective and interunit structure. 
Such a perspective would seem to offer an approach of practical 
significance. Here the contingency logic as applied to interorganizat- 
ional implementation is reviewed and its assumptions identified. To 
probe these assumptions, empirical evidence is analyzed from one 
policy sector which would seem especially promising. The findings 
suggest that even under highly favorable conditions, a contingency 
perspective provides only limited help. The research demonstrates the 
need for additional conceptual clarification and theoretical care in 
reaching conclusions about the impact of interorganizational struc- 
tures on policy settings. 
Complicated interorganizational arrangements are increas- 
ingly important in public management. How governance in 
the public interest may be possible in structures of high inter- 
dependence among public and nonpublic actors is a subject of 
considerable theoretical and practical significance. This article 
utilizes ideas developed in the study of interorganizational 
policy implementation to offer guidance regarding three mat- 
ters: the agenda for interorganizational analysis; the link be- 
tween analysis and prescription; and the role of the analyst of 
hnterorganizational arrangements. 
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An important perspective found in the literature on orga- 
nizations and policy implementation proposes that interunit 
structures be assessed for their degree of match, or mismatch, 
with policy objectives, and that practical suggestions can 
follow directly from such a contingency evaluation. This 
proposal is provocative and implies a great deal about interor- 
ganizational analysis. The strategy in the present article is to 
examine critically one version of this contingency approach as 
applied to multiunit systems. Special attention is given to a 
test of the assumptions undergirding this type of analysis. The 
intent is to suggest a set of issues and conclusions that extends 
beyond those discussed explicitly by contingency theorists or 
indeed by most interorganizational analysts. 
The argument draws from recently conducted empirical 
work to raise several general questions. The argument in 
outline form is that the assumptions of the contingency ap- 
proach are open to question and that this point carries implica- 
tions for the development of implementation theory, for the 
conduct of policy research, and for the role of the policy ana- 
lyst. 
CONTINGENCY AND INTERORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURES: THE ANALYTIC AGENDA AND 
RESEARCH STRATEGY 
Contingency approaches to the study of organization aim 
to relate structural attributes to various features of organiza- 
tional context (see, for example, Greenwood and Hinnings 
1976; Greenwood, Hinnings, and Ranson 1975; Pitt and Smith 
1981). Typically, the effort links structural patterns with char- 
acteristics of organizational task environments. As Peters 
observes, these approaches have been particularly weak at 
prescribing matches between structure and environment (1988, 
25; see also Hood 1979; Kaufman and Seidman 1970). 
Still, there are reasons to expect contingency theory link- 
ing policy characteristics with interorganizational structure-- 
intergovernmental grant patterns, public-private partnerships, 
interunit contract arrangements, and so forth--to hold promise. 
Government structure and policy content are plausibly related, 
according to institutional theorists (Ashford 1977). Thus theo- 
retical justifications for "local presence" or "adaptive" imple- 
mentation networks are driven by contingency logic as applied 
to the interorganizational policy context (Porter 1976; Porter 
and Olson 1976; Berman 1978). Indeed, public choice theory 
itself is based on the idea that "for each particular problem or 
governmental task, there will be one 'ideal' decision making 
publication do not necessarily reflect 
the views and policies of the U.S. 
Department of the Interior. An earlier 
version of this argument is contained 
in O'Toole 1990. 
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unit whose jurisdiction would be just coextensive with the 
actual extension of externalities" (Scharpf, Reissert, and 
Schnabel 1978, 65; see also Ostrom and Ostrom 1971). 
Some systematic contingency-based implementation stud- 
ies have been performed. Hull and Hjern, for instance, suggest 
how empirical theory about the relationship between multi- 
organizational systems and policy problems can help to unite 
prescriptive and positive approaches to policy analysis (Hull 
with Hjern 1987, 200; Hjern and Hull 1982). And Fritz Scharpf 
and colleagues have developed ideas for tapping the structure- 
policy contingency idea (see Scharpf 1977; 1978; 1986; 1987; 
1988; Scharpf, Reissert, and Schnabel 1978). In fact, this per- 
spective as developed by Scharpf and his collaborators has 
been widely influential in Europe (for instance, Harrison and 
Tether 1987; Hjern and Hull 1982; Hjem and Porter 1981; 
Rhodes 1980; Sharpe 1985). The following summary of key 
elements of the contingency approach relies especially on parts 
of his argument. Yet Scharpf himself recognizes a number of 
the difficulties inherent in any simple structure-policy problem 
match. The critique is aimed, therefore, at sketching the diffi- 
culties entailed in the contingency idea per se. 
The Contingency Approach: A Brief Summary 
The contingency approach begins with the claim that 
implementation structures based on joint or shared decision 
making among formally independent organizational units are 
typically needed for successful policy execution in modern 
welfare states. Authoritative command patterns involving 
single bureaucratic units are deemed increasingly rare. The 
development of intricate intergovernmental agreements and 
structures, complex interagency-based programs, and the many 
implementation patterns associated with "government by 
proxy" (Kettl 1988) are cited as illustrative of the trend. 
What sorts of interorganizational arrangements offer the 
most promise for dealing successfully with such complicated 
policy issues? No single pattern is optimal. Policy issues 
require certain types or degrees of coordination among the 
relevant actors, and the types of coordination requirements 
vary systematically with the kind of problem being addressed. 
Scharpf, Reissert, and Schnabel, for instance, develop a typo- 
logy of policy problem structures and an associated set of 
control requirements and control instruments (1976; 1978). 
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Often the actual structure offers a poor fit with the policy 
problem. Mismatches may stem from political forces, not 
merely lack of knowledge. Yet the contingency notion can 
thus lead to a rather convincing overall argument, as follows: 
Since it is possible in principle to match policy problems 
with interorganizational arrangements for implementation, 
analysis needs to determine the most appropriate structures for 
particular policy issues and to compare these results with 
existing interorganizational patterns. The agenda thereby 
created is a full one, not only because of the array of policy 
problems to be addressed but because of the various analytical 
and methodological advances that are required for such a 
matching effort.' Nevertheless, these tasks should prove to be 
especially valuable, because they facilitate a synthesis of empir- 
ical theory building and practical advice to policy makers and 
public managers. Since there is an "objective" answer (Scharpf 
1978, 350) to the question of what interorganizational arrange- 
ments match the policy issues at stake, the analyst can conduct 
research that generates results of direct practical import by 
highlighting "control deficits" and their causes. In so doing, 
researchers can assist either in resolving such control deficits 
(as is implied in Scharpf 1978) or, more pessimistically, in 
encouraging their recognition as immovable constraints of 
many joint decision making systems (as is proposed in Scharpf 
1977), thereby helping to jettison some of the demands unreal- 
istically placed on government.2 
It is important to recognize the real contribution made by 
the contingency perspective, for differing institutional arrange- 
ments can have predictably varying effects on policy (Scharpf 
1984; 1986; 1988). This approach stands as a major contribu- 
tion to the theory of managing in multiunit systems. Never- 
theless, any assessment of the approach must critically probe 
the key assumptions on the basis of which the contingency 
idea is so inventively developed. 
Matching Policy and Structure: Assumptions of the Approach 
For this general approach to the conduct of interorgan- 
izational policy studies to be successful, first, the policy to be 
studied must not be one that provokes significant disagree- 
ments among the organizational elements that are required to 
be linked during implementation. Second, there must be a 
defensible way to determine the "objective" structural require- 
ments of the policy. And third, the structural demands of the 
policy must be recognizable by the major players in the imple- 
mentation setting. If these conditions are not met, so that 
' With regard to the latter, for in- 
stance, Scharpf claims that 
"we ... need to develop and apply 
methods for the identification and 
measurement of differences in the 
'goodness of fit,' or congruence, be- 
tween prescriptive policy networks 
and empirical networks of interorgani 
zational dependence" (Scharpf 1978, 
363). 
2 In Scharpf's formulation, policy in- 
struments are also regarded as vital in 
generating the appropriate coordi- 
nation. He emphasizes as well that 
major structural changes are often 
impractical, and other policies also 
overlay extant networks (see Scharpf 
1977; 1978). This critique addresses 
only the elements of the contingency 
logic, not the broader claims. 
235/J-PART, April 1993 
Interorganizational Policy Studies 
disagreement is present among the actors about either the 
desirability of the policy or the appropriate interunit arrange- 
ment, identifying a structure-policy match that can induce 
coordinated action is unlikely. 
The argument developed below uses findings from some 
recently conducted research to probe the empirical plausibility 
of these notions. It is shown that they are unlikely to be met 
even in apparently straightforward cases. The implications of 
this conclusion are then sketched. 
A TEST OF THE ASSUMPTIONS 
The subject of infrastructure construction for wastewater 
treatment is suited for use in a straightforward test of the key 
assumptions on which the contingency approach is based. 
This is a field in which the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) indicates that more than $100 billion of new 
local government spending will be needed between now and 
the year 2000 (EPA 1988). This case is a policy management 
problem especially promising as a candidate for assessing 
match between structure and problem. The three assumptions 
listed above are all effectively met in the wastewater treatment 
infrastructure case--or, at least, they are met here in greater 
degree than is the case for most policy problems being imple- 
mented through interunit arrangements. 
First, the overall policy of significant investment in waste- 
water treatment infrastructure is broadly advocated among all 
major actors in the implementation setting. Even chambers of 
commerce and other probusiness groups seek regulatory 
compliance to provide the optimal setting for new growth. 
Second, the sector's technical features are well understood, at 
least in comparison with most issues provoking national atten- 
tion. Third, until the 1980s there was virtually no disagree- 
ment about the appropriateness of the interorganizational 
structure established to both develop and regulate the waste- 
water infrastructure. The implementation setting was stable, 
well accepted, and effective in raising the rate of compliance 
among local communities and in increasing the quality of the 
nation's waters. In fact, the only reason alternative interorgan- 
izational structures emerged in recent years is that severe 
budgetary constraints, when coupled with an ostensibly unre- 
lated policy change in another sector (see below), encouraged 
new organizations to enter the picture. 
Prior to recent developments, therefore, one reasonably 
could expect to have found an interorganizational arrangement 
well adapted to the wastewater infrastructure policy problem. 
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Whether it really was a good match, and whether it is possible 
even now to tell, are issues addressed presently. It is neces- 
sary first to summarize the policy changes of the 1980s that 
constituted the perturbation to the system and then to compare 
briefly the dominant interorganizational structure in this policy 
field with the structure that was induced in a number of cases 
through policy and spending modifications. 
The EPA's treatment plant construction grants program, 
the nation's primary policy instrument for dealing with capital 
financing of wastewater treatment plants, was in place for 
many years but was trimmed in the 1980s. Competition for 
funding among localities increased. In 1987, grants began to 
be eliminated altogether, in favor of a network of state-admin- 
istered revolving loan funds. During the period from 1981 to 
1986 in particular, an alternative involving privatization was ex- 
plored by many localities. Federal tax law changes in 1981 
and 1982 made capital-intensive privatization-that is, a private 
firm's assuming ownership and complete responsibility for all 
phases of infrastructure development and operations--much 
more feasible than it was earlier. For those who had little 
hope of a construction grant, the choice seemed to be between 
privatizing, thus reaping a portion of the tax-saving advantag- 
es, and financing the project themselves. The peak ofinterest 
in capital-intensive privatization now appears to have been 
relatively short-lived. Further tax-law changes in 1986 severely 
restricted the federal incentives. 
In short, therefore, policy shifts during the 1980s meant 
that decision makers in several locales opted for privatization 
as a strategy for infrastructure development. Simultaneously, 
decision makers in other cases began to implement their pro- 
jects through the grant-funded option that had been in place 
but was being slowly phased out. With each of these choices 
comes a characteristic interunit structure. Treating the two 
kinds of interorganizational arrangements for implementation 
as merely a comparison of "public" versus "private" would be 
oversimplified and misleading. There are many different 
forms of privatization. (Even in the field of wastewater treat- 
ment, contracting for services is much different than encourag- 
ing private companies' ownership of a municipal infrastruc- 
ture; the latter form is examined here.) And there are certainly 
many varieties of public implementation structures. The 
comparison here is between a largely public, intergovernmen- 
tal, grant-funded multiunit structure, on the one hand, and a 
public-private arrangement involving no direct federal finan- 
cial support and substantial formal private control, on the 
other. 
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In either the privatized or the grant-funded option the 
process of regulating the quality of effluence is exactly the 
same. The state agency (or, in the case of the twelve states 
that do not have regulatory authority, the national EPA) issues 
permits specifying standards. Monitoring is conducted by the 
state (federal) authorities; self-reporting is performed by local 
implementors, with some oversight from other levels. 
What differs is the structure of the arrangements for 
creating and running treatment plants. There are reasons to 
expect these differences to matter for implementation at the 
phases when plants are designed and built. In grant funding, 
the national EPA and state environmental agencies are asked 
to play an additional role that is likely to involve a fundamen- 
tally different set of multiorganizational relationships, besides 
that of direct or indirect pollutant regulator. EPA is the grant- 
ing agency and as such is asked to oversee almost every detail 
of design, contracting, and construction. The result can be 
expected to be continuing involvement by the regulators with 
several parties to the implementation process. In the privat- 
ized case, the source of funds for implementation is different 
and so is the implementation structure. Here the role of the 
regulator seems to be replaced by two integrating forces: first, 
the market, which allows relatively unhampered interaction 
among the banks, design firms, and builders; second, a more 
simplified normative environment--since once privatization is 
chosen as the implementation option, virtually all organization- 
al actors are likely to share a basic set of core values and 
world views involving speed, efficiency, and the need to 
maintain profit. The structure of the arrangement provides 
unmistakable encouragement for rapid resolution of any differ- 
ences. 
IMPLEMENTATION FINDINGS: 
ON THE COMPLICATIONS INVOLVED IN MATCHING 
STRUCTURE AND POLICY 
What implementation differences can be observed be- 
tween these two types of settings? And how can these differ- 
ences help to illuminate the contingency approach discussed 
earlier? Other studies have included details about what differ- 
ences could be expected, and they have also presented empiri- 
cal findings (OCToole 1989a; 1989b). These are relevant here 
only insofar as they shed light on the kind of research strategy 
appropriate for interorganizational public management. The 
approach used in the empirical portion is summarized as an 
appendix to the present article; the next several paragraphs 
summarize the findings in an abbreviated fashion and sharpen 
the issue of how these results bear on the agenda for the field. 
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The research examined differences between privatized and 
grant-funded interunit structures regarding both implementa- 
tion process and output. Six matched sets of localities were 
selected for especially intensive investigation, and these com- 
parisons were supplemented with additional analysis (see 
Appendix). Some findings of this comparison are directly 
relevant to the discussion as developed above. 
Participants in the privatized cases as a group reported 
smoother interactions; furthermore, an unobtrusive indicator of 
process smoothness-the size and number of "change orders" 
(orders to change design specifications during construction)-- 
indicated a similar conclusion. The most dramatic and unam- 
biguous process difference was in speed of implementation. 
All matched privatized cases proceeded much more quickly 
than their counterpart cases; mean difference in implementa- 
tion time amounted to 29.4 months for design and construction 
of infrastructure. On output grounds, all cases performed well 
over the two-year postconstruction period examined. Monthly 
measures of regulatory compliance were comparable and 
virtually complete across all cases (see O'Toole 1989a for a 
more thorough discussion of the evidence). 
The findings are, therefore, that these privatized imple- 
mentation structures create facilities for cleaning wastewater as 
well as do the federally involved, grant-funded patterns and 
do so more quickly than do the grant-funded variants; further, 
this achievement comes at no sacrifice to clean water output. 
Some economic models even suggest that this form of capital- 
intensive privatization costs less than grant funding and is 
even comparable to the nonprivatized and locally self-financed 
alternative in its effects on the national treasury (Holcombe 
1988). However, a closer look suggests that matters are more 
complex than this comparison suggests thus far. 
Limits of the Contingency Approach 
With regard to the earlier discussion of the assumptions 
underlying the contingency approach, one obvious conclusion 
is that it may not be so clear after all just when an inter- 
organizational structure provides an optimal match between 
structure and problem. Improvements induced in the privat- 
ized cases were an epiphenomenon of other policy shifts and 
were largely unanticipated by the regular actors in the policy 
networks. 
Additional implications follow from a closer look at these 
implementation settings. The empirical results seem to suggest 
that in this case a nonhierarchical interorganizational structure 
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was able to "outperform" an established, centrally orchestrated 
alternative at least on some important measures. However, the 
comparison across types of settings considers thus far only one 
type of output from the interorganizational arrangement: clean 
water, or compliance with regulatory standards. This goal is 
widely accepted in the various implementation networks, but it 
is hardly the only such goal. Connecting this point to some 
additional findings from the empirical project reveals implica- 
tions for the contingency perspective. 
Multiple Goals, Multiple Impacts of 
Interorganizational Structure 
Thus far the empirical findings have been described in 
terms largely consistent with the contingency approach's 
general admonition to researchers: Examine implementation 
settings for their degree of structural fit with the objective 
requisites of the policy. But have empirical and prescriptive 
goals really been unified here? One can answer in the affirma- 
tive only if the goal of clean water is not only an accepted one 
in the interorganizational setting but is also exclusively accept- 
ed in the network. In other words, the contingency argument 
is crucially reliant on another assumption--that there is one 
and only one policy goal operative in the network. A closer 
look at the wastewater example can demonstrate that even in a 
straightforward case, that is, one with a clear, easily measured, 
and readily accepted policy goal operating in an interorgan- 
izational setting, any effort to consider only this objective in 
determining the match between structure and policy consti- 
tutes an oversimplification. 
Additional goals in intergovernmental, interorganizational 
implementation settings can be conceptualized as fitting into 
four categories (see O'Toole 1989b): (1) additional goals estab- 
lished at the national level directly connected with the policy 
and subject to the most detailed investigation (examples in this 
policy sector are national inducements toward the use of 
"innovative and alternative" technology for wastewater treat- 
ment and the use of performance standards regarding in- 
creased long-term technical capacity to run treatment plants); 
(2) other national mandates that apply broadly to several 
policy sectors (examples here are affirmative action/equal 
employment opportunity and the regulation of competition 
between union and nonunion wage scales); (3) goals of state 
and local governments (these units have objectives that are as 
legitimate and legitimated--widely accepted, even at other 
levels-as those obviously mandated in Washington (two exam- 
ples in this policy field are the preservation of a realm of local 
autonomy and the protection of accountability channels at the 
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local level); and (4) objectives of other participants in the 
implementation process. Thus "goal multiplicity" is an ubiqui- 
tous part of the interorganizational setting. That this general- 
ization applies even for a straightforward case like infrastruc- 
ture development for wastewater treatment can be suggested 
by the examples listed under goal categories 1 through 3 
above. (The issue is treated in detail in O'Toole 1989b.) 
Findings on Multiple Goals and Multiple Impacts 
In this wastewater treatment infrastructure research, 
further analysis was undertaken to assess the execution of 
additional policy goals important for public actors in the 
networks (see Appendix). The findings are illuminating and 
complex. The overall conclusion is that the interorganizational 
structures make a difference. Some additional goals that were 
examined seem to be compromised during implementation 
under privatized conditions, but these are not goals coming 
consistently from one level of government. One or two goals 
actually may have been enhanced in the privatized arrange- 
ment. For still other goals there is reason to withhold judg- 
ment, since some subtle consequences are likely to emerge 
only over the long haul. 
In short, the move from grant funding to capital-intensive 
privatization in this policy field appears to be an unambiguous 
advance, a Pareto improvement, when examined from the 
viewpoint of clean water process and output. However, when 
the comparison is conducted on somewhat different but equal- 
ly defensible grounds, multiple tradeoffs emerge. 
One illustration is the goal of local government autonomy. 
Virtually all actors in the interorganizational patterns examined 
for this research claimed to accept, and most to support active- 
ly, the objective (or, perhaps, metaobjective)--strongly endorsed 
by the local governments--of local autonomy, usually inter- 
preted in terms of a municipality's ability to have substantial 
influence over mainly local affairs. An interesting finding, 
however, is the extent to which local autonomy can be com- 
promised by the shift to privatized structures, as municipalities 
become heavily dependent on large private firms via long-term 
contracts that may apportion risks asymmetrically (see O'Toole 
1989b). By pursuing indirectly an increased private-sector role 
in implementation settings, the national government may have 
diminished the discretion of such other units of government. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR 
INTERORGANIZATIONAL POLICY MANAGEMENT 
The findings summarized briefly in the preceding section 
are rich with implications for the field of interorganizational 
policy implementation. In this section some of the most signif- 
icant of these are sketched. The section covers lessons for the 
conduct of research, for the tasks of empirical analysis and 
prescription, and for the role of the analyst overall. 
Lessons: On the Limits of Matching Structure and Policy in 
Interorganizational Studies 
The larger contingency agenda for interorganizational 
analysis is called into question by the findings in the case 
presented above. There is no denying the significance of the 
insight that interorganizational patterns do display better or 
worse fits to policy problems. Yet several complications 
emerge if one attempts to carry out a straightforward analysis 
even in the simple case of infrastructure development for 
wastewater treatment. First, the selection of the optimum 
"objective" match of structure and policy problem, even when 
one restricts oneself only to clean water matters, is not unam- 
biguous. A well-accepted structure is shown to have deficien- 
cies when compared with a relatively untested alternative 
generated almost accidentally from other forces in the policy 
setting. Second, the structures score differently when evaluat- 
ed separately for implementation process and output, thus 
suggesting that the structure-policy problem is more intricate. 
Third, the analysis of the impact of structure realistically 
cannot be restricted to a simple, single-criterion measure of 
policy output, even when this goal is widely accepted and 
salient. In the present context, if clean water is the "mandate" 
around which policy implementation patterns are built, so are 
the encouragement of innovative wastewater treatment tech- 
nology, the achievement of affirmative action goals, and the 
mitigation of union-nonunion labor competition also policy 
goals in no less certain a sense. Structures for interorgan- 
izational implementation can indeed be compared; such com- 
parisons must be an important part of the field of interorga- 
nizational policy management. But the tradeoffs are likely to 
be complex. Therefore, the role of the analyst becomes simul- 
taneously more complicated, more appropriately hedged by 
restrictions, but perhaps more important, as explained below. 
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Lessons: On Strategic Behavior and Limits of the 
Contingency Approach 
In fact, independent of the analysis in the preceding subsec- 
tion, a strong argument can be sketched to show that simple 
matches between structure and problem are unlikely to be 
helpful in practice. The actors in interorganizational structures 
are not indifferent to the implications of the setting for their 
own sets of goals. These actors are capable of strategic moves. 
To the extent that the actors in an interorganizational network 
are aware of the appropriate kind of interunit structure for 
implementing a widely shared goal, the chances increase that 
the actors will attempt to "leverage" the network. The easier 
the imputation of a match between structure and policy prob 
lem, the more reason for actors to add objectives, and thus 
constraints, and thus multiple criteria, to the arrangement. The 
attractiveness of this approach easily is demonstrated in empir- 
ical terms by noting the emergence of scores of "crosscutting" 
and "crossover" regulations associated with intergovernmental 
programs in the United States during the last fifteen years 
(see, e.g., ACIR 1984). 
When additional goals incorporated into the inter- 
organizational setting are acceptable across all or most of the 
actors--and when, as can be expected typically, the "objective" 
requirements of these policy objectives do not match the struc- 
tural requirements of the policy problem that provided the 
original focus for the coordinative effort--then there can be no 
technical (structural) fix for the interorganizational design 
problem. Of course, when contentious goals are a part of the 
setting, or when several goals are widely accepted but are of 
unequal salience across the network, the notion of a technical 
fix is even more chimerical. In short, then, the contingency 
approach to the conduct of interorganizational policy research 
seems vulnerable to the weakness of its assumptions, especial- 
ly the idea of straightforward and prescriptively useful struc- 
ture-policy matches. 
Lessons: On the Conceptual Ambiguity of the 
Top-DownfBottom-Up Distinction 
The conceptual difficulties facing the interorganizational 
study of policy are highlighted by the findings described 
above. If the research shows some positive features of a bot- 
tom-up perspective, the findings also tend to question implicit 
assumptions of the bottom-up credo (meant here in a norma- 
tive sense; see below). The conclusions about privatized set- 
tings creating possibilities for reduced local autonomy highlight 
this point. The findings here are parallel to some conclusions 
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reached by scholars of regulatory agencies in the United States, 
which can have their dependence on regulated interests in- 
creased by the ostensibly "independent" commission structure 
(for example, Bernstein 1955). 
That this is so suggests ambiguity in some basic conceptu- 
alizations used by researchers in the field. The ambiguity 
seems to extend to the very notions of top-down and bottom- 
up approaches. There seem to be several dimensions on which 
top-down and bottom-up perspectives may be distinguished. 
At least three such dimensions may be identified here: 
1. Empirical theory. That is, which variables do research- 
ers assert are the key ones? Some (top-down analysts) assert 
the prominence of such elements as policy characteristics and 
central monitoring processes (e.g., Mazmanian and Sabatier 
1989), while others (bottom-uppers) argue that contextual, 
field, or local forces dominate over central ones during the 
conversion of policy into action (e.g., Porter 1976; Berman 
1978). 
2. Method. Which part of the implementation world do 
researchers choose to examine? The distinction between em- 
pirical theory and method developed here draws from Elster's 
analysis of pluralism (see 1979, 113-14, n. 4). Some studies 
focus at the "bottom" of the implementation arrangement, 
while others systematically examine those at the "top." It is 
possible for both groups to conduct research in this fashion 
without committing themselves to a set of detailed assertions 
about the relative importance of variables located at different 
places in the implementation arrangements (Winter 1990). 
3. Normative premise. That is, which part of the inter- 
organizational pattern should be given the most leverage to 
influence what happens? One view (a bottom-up perspective) 
argues for maximizing leverage at the street level, while anoth- 
er (top-down) sketches the problems inherent in such an ap- 
proach and seeks central uniformities and constraints--often 
out of a desire to achieve liberal democratic legitimacy, or to 
enhance a certain view of equity, or to benefit certain disad- 
vantaged minorities at the local or regional level by redress 
from the center. 
The melding of these dimensions can lead to difficulties in 
theoretical and practical understanding. The confusion in- 
volved in assuming that loosening hierarchical ties means 
increasing local discretion, or that advocating nonhierarchical 
structures constitutes advocacy for the interests of those at the 
bottom may suggest a naive liberal fallacy: that from absence 
of overt or authoritative links one can infer "freedom" or 
maneuverability. A theme emphasized by Scharpf (1988) may 
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be in order here as a corrective: Analysts need to be sensitive 
to influence exercised through the arrangement of structures 
themselves, not simply to the results of discrete observable 
interactions. 
Lessons: On the Need for Broader Investigation of 
Structural Possibilities 
Beyond the lessons about conceptual clarity and theoreti- 
cal precision, the findings summarized above contain implica- 
tions for the conduct of interorganizational research and for 
the overall field of policy studies. Researchers need to be 
wary of stereotyped assumptions regarding the impacts of 
particular types of interorganizational structures on policy 
settings. Indeed, researchers in the field may need to broaden 
their investigations of the structural possibilities. Structures 
for privatization are one important category of arrangements, 
but they are far from the only example. The present article 
builds a case that there is no "one best way" to structure set- 
tings, even for easy policy issues. And recognizing the strate- 
gic character of organizational moves in interunit cooperative 
settings implies a need for even more caution in any analytical 
matching effort. 
These conclusions in turn mean that the possibility of an 
empirical/prescriptive melding of activities and roles for the 
analyst can occur only by omitting from consideration addi- 
tional, equally legitimate policy problems in the same setting- 
a debatable proposal. Policy networks and settings can be 
expected to be alive with conflicting or at least competing 
structural requirements and the consequent need for policy 
experts at many levels to assess tradeoffs via a range of politi- 
cal criteria. 
Lessons: On the Role of the Analyst 
The analyst, consequently, cannot make the leap from 
empirical investigation to structural prescription without 
assuming a rather more important role than anticipated by the 
contingency perspective. Beyond the choices among policy 
objectives, additional prescriptive implications flow from the 
kinds of practical suggestions likely to be made by an analyst 
of interorganizational implementation. How much can and 
should the policy network be simplified to assist in goal achie- 
vement? This question raises the issue of whether the analyst 
should reduce complexity--more ominously, rig the game 
structurally--through "selective activation" of networks, "nega- 
tive coordination," and so forth (see Scharpf, Reissert, and 
Schnabel 1978). Indeed, this role of the analyst seems to in- 
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volve several quite explicitly political tasks. These include 
helping to arrange the network so as to include or exclude 
certain points of leverage, helping to select policy instruments 
for their conflict-reducing potential, and assisting in the identi- 
fication of processes that might move interunit negotiations 
toward productive problem solving (see, for example, Scharpf 
1988). 
All these features of the analyst's possible realm of action 
are very important; they suggest the outlines of an activist role 
that is far more encompassing than serving as a conduit for the 
results of empirical analysis. Instead, they can be seen as 
moves at the level of constitutional choice (see Kiser and 
Ostrom 1982): The analyst obliquely structures the rules of the 
game within which policy choices are developed. The difficul- 
ty with some versions of the empirical-prescriptive portrayal of 
the researcher's role is that the argument conveys the mislead- 
ing impression that the analyst is operating here under the 
imperative of social science. 
The point can be put simply. Analysts may seek influence 
at the constitutional level; certainly contingency analysts of 
implementation settings are correct in inferring that inter- 
organizational policy studies have a uniquely important role to 
play in deliberations about how to structure policy systems. 
I myself have argued in favor of the use of analysis to influ- 
ence the structure and problem-solving capacities of joint 
decision-making settings (see, for example, Montjoy and 
O'Toole 1991). However, they and their patrons should be 
under no illusion that such influence consists merely of the 
elaboration of empirical findings or the logic involved in 
matching structure with problem. 
A recommendation in favor of privatized structures for 
infrastructure development, to use the case employed in this 
article, would carry more than analytical or even policy-related 
momentum. Such a proposal constitutes a suggestion about 
how certain kinds of basic choices--for instance, whether to 
give priority to market forces and economic reasoning--should 
be made in social and political settings. Uniting a structural 
analysis directly with prescription means seeking to influence 
how societies "bind themselves" (see Elster 1979, 37). When 
the analyst moves at the constitutional rather than nmerely the 
analytical or even the policy level, he or she is assuming a 
fundamentally different role than that implied by discussions 
of objective requirements. 
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This point in turn suggests others. The analytical tasks of 
deciphering tradeoffs and possibly suggesting to actors an 
array of choices about how they might structure the game 
means a more elevated role for the analyst of interorgan- 
izational studies. However, correlative with this role comes 
responsibility and related questions of accountability. This 
recognition is likely to be obscured if one does not clarify the 
uniquely influential role the analyst assumes. The correlative 
issue of the kinds of constraints required for appropriate and 
responsible advocacy by interorganizational researchers in such 
contexts has not even begun to be explored. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Interorganizational structure indeed seems to affect policy 
action. In view of this finding, theoretical efforts have been 
made to develop a contingency approach to interorganizational 
policy management. Such a perspective would seek to deter- 
mine the most appropriate interunit structures to correspond 
with various policy problems, to identify settings where poli- 
cies confront structural mismatches, and to seek practical 
action in response. Such an approach to interorganizational 
analysis would seem to provide both a clear agenda for re- 
search in the field and a means of fusing the empirical and 
prescriptive roles of the analyst. 
This approach relies on a set of empirical assumptions. 
It has been shown that even when a policy is widely support- 
ed by the variety of implementation actors involved, when its 
technical features are well understood, and when agreement 
has been developed among the various parties involved as to 
the appropriate kind of interunit structure, a contingency 
approach provides only limited help. Unplanned or innova- 
tive structures, such as certain privatized patterns generated by 
serendipity, may generate performance improvements. A 
more important limitation flows from a demonstration that the 
contingency approach requires not only that the policy goal 
under investigation be accepted through the network, but that 
it be the only policy goal in the network. In practice a variety 
of additional goals--typically including several enunciated from 
the center--entangle the policy matrix. These additional poli- 
cies also interact with structure, and the results across the 
range of policy goals are likely to be complex and uneven. 
Furthermore, to the extent that policy goals are widely sup- 
ported among the multiple parties involved, those same partic- 
ipants are likely to behave strategically--complicating the 
matrix in an effort to acquire leverage. 
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The evidence here can be employed to demonstrate a 
variety of conclusions regarding the agenda for interorgan- 
izational analysis, the nature of the link between analysis and 
prescription, and the posture of the analyst of interorganizati- 
onal settings. The logic developed here demonstrates the need 
for additional conceptual clarification and theoretical care in 
reaching conclusions about the impact of interorganizational 
structures on policy settings. Examining the apparently 
straightforward case of infrastructure development shows that 
the interorganizational analyst, when addressing the policy 
community, directly engages constitutional-level issues of 
fundamental importance. Thus a close consideration of the 
agenda for interorganizational studies generates more ques- 
tions than answers. The encouraging element follows from the 
recognition that the questions are important and that answer- 
ing them will help to solve crucial challenges to contemporary 
governance. 
APPENDIX: APPROACH USED IN THE 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
The empirical research focused on differences between 
privatized and grant-funded interunit structures regarding 
both implementation process and output. The unit of analysis 
was the locality and its new treatment plant implementation 
structure. Virtually all privatized cases for which there were 
sufficient data for analysis at the time of the field work were 
included in the data set for analysis. 
Six of these were selected for especially intensive investi- 
gation. For instance, each was matched with a comparable 
publicly funded case. (One pair involved a privatized case 
and a municipally financed rather than federally subsidized 
instance and is omitted from the discussion that follows.) 
Cases were matched by state, approximate time period of 
implementation, scale of facility, community size and demo- 
graphics, and water quality problems. State regulators nomi- 
nated candidate matching cases, but the researcher made the 
actual selections. Substantial data were gathered from two 
other privatized cases. Detailed interviews and data gather- 
ing-- including interviews via a eighteen-page, semistructured 
questionnaire--took place at all these sites. Additional infor- 
mation was gathered from the other two privatized cases for 
which there was operating experience at the time of the empir- 
ical research. In the field work, the primary subjects were the 
local officials with major administrative responsibility for the 
policy; additional interviews were conducted with a variety of 
other public and private actors. Information was gathered on 
numerous matters related to wastewater treatment, especially 
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implementation processes and outputs. One of the matched 
pairs involved cases administered via the same local agency; 
this organization had decided to construct two plants nearly 
simultaneously, and it consciously sought to compare the 
processes by arranging for one of these to be handled by the 
grant-funded mechanism and the other to be privatized. 
Further steps were taken in the analysis, including a 
comparison between privatized cities and other cases where 
privatization was explicitly considered but rejected. Less 
detailed comparisons developed from the sampling of EPA 
data bases. Findings from all types of comparisons were 
consistent (see O'Toole 1989a). However, the matched case 
analysis is the focus of the discussion here. It offers the best 
way of controlling for the many potentially confounding vari- 
ables. Furthermore, the matching approach (and especially the 
findings from the matched cases in the single locale) suggest 
that observed differences were not the result of "creaming" by 
private firms in select sorts of local conditions. For instance, 
the finding on speed of implementation held clearly for the 
locale which itself contained matched cases, and it held in a 
comparison of privatized cases with a larger sample from EPA 
data bases (p = .001). 
To conduct the additional analysis on multiple goals, from 
which some findings are described in the body of the article, a 
small subset of the goals identified by the actors in the imple- 
mentation setting was investigated to assess the relative effec- 
tiveness of the structures. Six additional policy goals--two 
each in categories 1 through 3 above, all widely recognized as 
important by virtually all actors in the system--were examined 
to assess the degree of output achieved across the types of 
interorganizational patterns (O'Toole 1989b). 
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